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Abstract 
 A fundamental aspect of human visual perception is the ability to recognize and locate 
objects in the environment. Importantly, our environment is predominantly three-dimensional 
(3D), but while there is considerable research exploring the binding of object features and 
location, it is unknown how depth information interacts with features in the object binding 
process. A recent paradigm called the spatial congruency bias demonstrated that 2D location is 
fundamentally bound to object features (Golomb, Kupitz, & Thiemann, 2014), such that 
irrelevant location information biases judgments of object features, but irrelevant feature 
information does not bias judgments of location or other features. Here, using the spatial 
congruency bias paradigm, we asked whether depth is processed as another type of location, or 
more like other features. We initially found that depth cued by binocular disparity biased 
judgments of object color. However, this result seemed to be driven more by the disparity 
differences than the depth percept: Depth cued by occlusion and size did not bias color 
judgments, whereas vertical disparity information (with no depth percept) did bias color 
judgments. Our results suggest that despite the 3D nature of our visual environment, only 2D 
location information – not position-in-depth – seems to be automatically bound to object 
features, with depth information processed more similarly to other features than to 2D 
location.  
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1.0. Introduction 
 A fundamental aspect of human visual perception is the ability to recognize and locate 
objects in the environment. Locating and recognizing are often considered separate processes, 
but the combination of this information is critical for interacting with objects. This idea that 
different object features or properties need to be integrated has been coined the “binding 
problem” (Treisman and Gelade, 1980), and can refer to the binding of different object features 
(e.g. the sun is round and yellow), or the binding of object features to their locations, which 
might involve different neural mechanisms (Piekema, Rijpkema, Fernández, & Kessels, 2010). 
Importantly for the latter, in the real world we need to locate objects in a 3D environment. 
While there is considerable research examining the process of binding object location and 
features to perceive a coherent object, this has primarily focused on 2D location, with very 
little understood about how 3D location and features interact for object perception. 
In particular, 2D location has often been considered to play a special role in visual 
perception, above and beyond that seen for other object features (Cave & Pashler, 1995; H. 
Chen & Wyble, 2015; Z. Chen, 2009; Golomb et al., 2014; Moore, Lanagan-Leitzel, Chen, 
Halterman, & Fine, 2007; Pertzov & Husain, 2014; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Tsal & Lavie, 1988, 
1993). However, little research has explored 3D location, specifically position-in-depth, and it is 
unknown whether the special role seen for 2D location information also extends to depth 
location.  
A recent example of the special role of 2D location information in object perception 
comes in the form of the spatial congruency bias (Golomb et al., 2014), where two objects are 
more likely to be judged as the same identity if they appear in the same spatial location. 
Golomb and colleagues (2014) showed that despite location information being irrelevant to the 
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task, participants were automatically biased to judge features of two objects as more similar 
when sharing the same location. Location information has been shown to bias a variety of 
features, including Gabors, colors, shapes, and faces (Golomb et al., 2014; Shafer-Skelton, 
Kupitz, & Golomb, Submitted). Moreover, the spatial congruency bias seems to be particular to 
location, in that identity information does not bias location judgments, nor do features such as 
color and shape induce a bias of each other (Golomb et al., 2014).  This finding of location 
biasing features is consistent with past research positing a unique role for location during 
object processing, including the feature integration theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), which 
proposed that spatial attention is required to bind features into a coherent object, as well as 
more recent work (e.g. Cave & Pashler, 1995; H. Chen & Wyble, 2015; Z. Chen, 2009; Moore et 
al., 2007; Pertzov & Husain, 2014; Tsal & Lavie, 1988, 1993). For example, Tsal and Lavie (1993) 
found that when instructed to report one of two targets based on the color of a cue, 
participants were unable to ignore the location of the cue, even though it was irrelevant and 
detrimental to performance, supporting a unique role of location. 
 How does depth interact with object features? In particular, does position-in-depth 
information bias feature judgments in the same way as 2D location information does? A recent 
study from our lab (Finlayson & Golomb, Under Review) explored the interactions between 2D 
and depth locations using the spatial congruency bias, finding that 2D locations bias depth 
judgments, but the reverse is not true: depth information does not bias 2D location judgments. 
However, while depth may not bias 2D location judgments, it is unknown whether depth 
biases judgments of other object features. In other words, is depth processed like other 
features (in which case it should not induce a spatial congruency bias), or is it processed more 
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like another type of location (in which case we would expect depth to bias these other feature 
judgments)? 
A number of studies have demonstrated similarities between 2D and depth effects, 
such as response priming that is seen for 2D locations (Posner, 1980) also seen for depth 
(Atchley, Kramer, Andersen, & Theeuwes, 1997; Downing & Pinker, 1985; Finlayson, 
Remington, Retell, & Grove, 2013; Nakayama & Silverman, 1986), and other findings showing 
depth as advantageous for object recognition (Caziot & Backus, 2015). On the other hand, 
several studies have suggested that although depth may play an important role in the visual 
system, the perceptual and attention effects of depth are weaker or delayed compared to 
those effects seen for 2D space (Finlayson et al., 2013; Gilinsky, 1951; Kasai, Morotomi, 
Katayama, & Kumada, 2003; Loomis et al., 2008; Moore, Hein, Grosjean, & Rinkenauer, 2009). 
In addition, although neurophysiological and functional neuroimaging research have 
demonstrated that depth and binocular disparity information is encoded by neurons in much 
of visual cortex (Backus, Fleet, Parker, & Heeger, 2001; Ban, Preston, Meeson, & Welchman, 
2012; Durand, Peeters, Norman, Todd, & Orban, 2009; Peter Neri, Bridge, & Heeger, 2004; 
Preston, Li, Kourtzi, & Welchman, 2008; Tsao et al., 2003; Welchman, Deubelius, Conrad, 
Bülthoff, & Kourtzi, 2005), the earliest representations may not be linked with the percept of 
depth (Preston et al., 2008), and true position-in-depth information may not emerge until later 
in the visual processing stream compared to 2D location information (Barendregt, Harvey, 
Rokers, & Dumoulin, 2015; Finlayson & Golomb, Under Review). 
Here we explored the interaction between position-in-depth and feature perception 
using the spatial congruency bias paradigm to ask if depth locations bias feature judgments 
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(object color). We first conducted an experiment testing the influence of irrelevant depth 
location information on color judgments using binocular disparity to cue depth perception 
(Experiment 1). We then followed up with two experiments to further probe the role of depth 
information. First, we re-tested the effects of depth on color judgments using monocular 
depth cues (occlusion and size: Experiment 2). Second, we dissociated the effects of depth-
from-disparity information from pure disparity (eye-specific location) information by testing if 
vertical disparity, which does not create a depth percept, induces a spatial congruency bias 
(Experiment 3). 
 
2.0. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants. Seventeen subjects (9 female; mean age = 19 years; range: 18-21) 
participated. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal color and binocular 
vision, and were screened for normal stereovision. Informed consent was obtained for all 
participants, the Ohio State University Behavioral and Social Sciences Institutional Review 
Board approved the study protocols, and the research was carried out in accordance with the 
Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). All participants were 
compensated with course credit. Sample size was chosen to match the original spatial 
congruency experiment reported in Golomb et al. (2014), which had a Cohen’s d = 1.01 and 
statistical power (1 - ) of 0.96 with N = 16; one extra participant was run in Experiment 1 due 
to over-scheduling. According to criteria set in advance, participants who performed the task 
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with <55% accuracy were excluded from analyses; however, no participants needed to be 
excluded.  
2.1.2. Stimuli. Stimuli were generated with the Psychtoolbox extension (Brainard, 
1997) for MATLAB (MathWorks). Depth from binocular disparity was achieved using a 
Wheatstone stereoscope, with two 24” flat screen LCD monitors facing each other with mirrors 
set between and reflecting an image from each monitor to each eye of the observer. The 
viewing distance was 60 cm, with the observer sitting at a chinrest 90° to the monitors. The 
monitors were color calibrated with a Minolta CS-100 colorimeter. 
Stimuli were colored squares on a black background, with size depending on depth 
location. For the back (far) disparity, stimuli were sized 0.71° × 0.71°, and at the front (close) 
disparity, stimuli were sized 0.99° × 0.99°. Subjects fixated at the center of the screen on a 
small 0.27° dot, always presented at the central screen depth (zero disparity). Stimuli were 
presented peripherally and could vary in horizontal, vertical, and depth location.   
2.1.3. Procedure & Design. Participants began each trial by fixating in the center for 
500 ms, after which the first stimulus appeared in a peripheral location for 250 ms (Figure 1). 
This was followed by a blank screen (50 ms) and then a mask (100 ms). Following a random 
delay period of either 550ms or 1000ms, a second stimulus appeared. The second stimulus was 
presented for the same duration and masked as the first. The first stimulus color was chosen 
randomly from 180 colors along an isoluminant color wheel (evenly distributed along a circle in 
CIE L*a*b* color space, centered on L=70, a=20, b=38, radius=60). When the second stimulus 
differed in color (50% of trials), it was chosen as a small color difference in either direction on 
the color wheel. The magnitude of the color difference was staircased for each participant 
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during the practice block to converge on 75% accuracy, and was further adjusted between 
main blocks as necessary (e.g. if >85% or <65% accuracy). The average difference between the 
two stimuli was 11.5 points on the color wheel.  
Vertical and depth locations of the first stimulus were randomly assigned for each trial, 
from the following possibilities: vertical location 5.46° above or below fixation, depth position 
30 arcmin (0.5°) in front of or behind fixation. Horizontal location was always centered on the 
screen, in line with fixation. The second stimulus appeared equally likely in one of four 
locations relative to the first stimulus: same or different depth location by same or different 
vertical location. These four conditions were counterbalanced and equally likely. 
Participants were instructed to judge whether the two colors were the same, and 
location was irrelevant to the task. Participants responded by keyboard press and were 
presented with visual feedback (green or red dot) informing them whether or not their 
response was correct (500ms). They were also provided with feedback if they broke fixation at 
any point during the trial, and the trial was aborted and re-run later in the block. Participants 
completed 64 trials per block, comprising 16 trials per each of the four irrelevant-location 
conditions, in randomized order. Each participant completed one practice block and 5-7 main 
blocks (two participants were unable to complete the full 7 blocks in time due to slower 
response times).  
Eye position was monitored with an EyeLink 1000 eye-tracking system, recording 
monocular pupil and corneal reflection position. Fixation was monitored for all experiments. If 
at any point the participant’s fixation deviated from the central fixation point by greater than 
1.5°, the trial was aborted and repeated. 
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the task and stimuli locations for Experiment 1, where 
the task was to indicate whether the two objects were the same or different colors, while 
ignoring the irrelevant location information (vertical and depth position). The difference 
in color between the two objects was subtle (adjusted individually to 75% accuracy 
threshold). Inset shows sample stimuli for Experiment 2. Experiment 3 was identical to 
Experiment 1, but the stimuli varied in horizontal position, and vertical disparity was 
used instead of horizontal disparity (depth). 
 
2.1.4. Analyses. Our primary measure for all experiments was the Spatial Congruency 
Bias (Golomb et al., 2014). For each participant, we first calculated hit and false alarm rates for 
each location condition. We defined a “hit” as a “same color” response when the stimuli 
actually were the same color, and a “false alarm” as a “same color” response when the stimuli 
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were actually different colors. We treated this as analogous to a “yes-no” task (Green & Swets, 
1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004), where participants judged whether the second color was 
the same as the first reference color. Using the hit rate and false alarm rate, we used signal 
detection theory to calculate bias (criterion) for each location condition.  
For all experiments we focus on the bias measure because our main goal was to assess 
the spatial congruency bias (Golomb et al., 2014) for position-in-depth. However, as secondary 
analyses we also report reaction time and d-prime measures to assess whether position-in-
depth also results in response facilitation. Values for each of these measures, as well as raw 
proportion of “same” responses, and alternate ways of calculating bias (normalized c and 
likelihood ratio ), can be found in Table 1.   
Bias (criterion) = -(z(hit rate) + z(false-alarm rate)) / 2 
d’ = z(hit rate) - z(false-alarm rate) 
Normalized c = bias / d’ 
Likelihood ratio () = e(z(false-alarm rate)^2 -  z(hit rate)^2)/2     
Values for all measures were averaged separately for each participant and condition 
and submitted to repeated-measures ANOVAs, with effect size calculated with partial eta 
squared. Trials on which participants failed to respond, or responded with RTs greater than 2.5 
standard deviations of the participant’s mean RT, were excluded.  
2.2. Results 
2.2.1. Congruency Bias. Figure 2a illustrates the bias of responding “same color” as a 
function of the different irrelevant location conditions: a negative bias indicates a greater 
tendency to respond “same color”. We found that irrelevant 2D and depth location information 
11 
biased color judgments, such that when the two objects were in the same 2D or depth location, 
participants were more likely to report that the objects were the same color. A two-way 
repeated-measures ANOVA with factors vertical location (same/different) and depth location 
(same/different) revealed that although in the right direction, neither of the main effects 
reached significance (Y; F1,16 = 3.37, p = 0.085, ηp2 = 0.17, Z; F1,16 = 4.38, p = 0.053, ηp2 = 0.22 
respectively), but there was a significant two-way interaction (F1,16 = 4.95, p = 0.041, ηp2 = 0.24). 
Follow-up t-tests showed a significant bias for same compared to different depth location 
when vertical location was held the same (t16 = -2.59, p = 0.020, d = 0.73), and a significant bias 
for same compared to different vertical location when depth was held the same (t16 = -2.42, p = 
0.028, d = 0.54).   
2.2.2. Other effects. As noted above, our primary measure of interest was the 
congruency bias. However, other measures are listed in Table 1. There was a significant 
influence of vertical location on d’ (F1,16 = 7.82, p = 0.013, ηp2 = 0.33), with no main effect for 
depth location (F1,16 = 1.28, p = 0.274, ηp2 = 0.07), and no interaction (F1,16 = 2.51, p = 0.133, ηp2 = 
0.14). RT priming was significant for depth location (F1,16 = 11.66, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.42) but not 
for vertical location (F1,16 = 1.48, p = 0.242, ηp2 = 0.09), with no interaction (F1,16 = 2.33, p = 0.146, 
ηp2 = 0.13). 
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Figure 2. Congruency bias results from Experiment 1. Bias is plotted for each of the four 
irrelevant location conditions, same or different 2D (vertical) and depth (horizontal disparity) 
location. Negative response biases indicate greater likelihood to report “same”. Error bars 
show SEM (N=17). 
 
2.3. Discussion 
The 2D spatial congruency effect was primarily replicated: when depth location was the 
same, there was a bias for same versus different vertical location. Our main question was 
whether irrelevant depth location information also induced a spatial congruency bias, such that 
stimulus colors were judged as more similar when they appeared at the same depth. We found 
a spatial congruency bias for depth location, although this interacted with vertical location, 
such that we only saw a significant biasing of color judgments when both vertical and depth 
locations were the same. 
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However, there is an important potential confound here: In this experiment binocular 
(horizontal) disparity was used to cue depth perception. Binocular disparity is achieved by 
small horizontal differences in opposite directions for each eye, and 2D location information is 
known to induce a strong spatial congruency bias, even for very small differences in location. 
Thus, it is unclear if the bias we found here for “depth” location was truly due to the difference 
in perceived depth position, or if may have actually been due to these small 2D location 
differences for each eye. In Experiments 2 and 3, we attempt to dissociate these possibilities in 
two ways. In Experiment 2, we test whether the bias for depth-from-disparity generalizes to 
other, non-disparity depth cues, in particular occlusion and size. In Experiment 3, we then test 
whether disparity differences alone induce a bias, by varying vertical disparity between the 
eyes (which does not create a depth percept).   
 
3.0. Experiment 2 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants. Sixteen subjects (9 female; mean age = 22 years; range: 19-36) 
participated. None were excluded. 
3.1.2. Stimuli, Procedure & Design. Stimuli were similar to Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions: The colored squares were presented on a mid-gray background (40% 
contrast), with size either 0.90° × 0.90° (back) or 1.1° × 1.1° (front). An 8° × 8° square filled with 
random noise (light and dark gray colored pixels: 24% and 55% maximum luminance of the 
display, respectively) was always present on the screen, centered on fixation at the central 
screen depth (see inset in Fig. 1). Stimuli were presented to appear either in front of (front) or 
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behind (back) this square. Front versus back depth differences were cued both by size 
differences (larger for front) and occlusion cues; “front” stimuli were presented such that they 
occluded part of the square, while “back” stimuli were partially occluded by the square (one-
quarter of the stimulus). All depth cues were monocular in this experiment; there were no 
disparity differences between stimuli.  
Stimuli were presented peripherally in one of eight locations. The horizontal and 
vertical locations were 4° above or below and to the left or right of fixation, centered on the 
four corners of the occlusion square. Each of these four positions could be presented as “front” 
or “back” depth. Position was assigned randomly for the first stimulus, and the second stimulus 
could appear in one of four conditions relative to the first stimulus: same or different 2D 
location by same or different depth location. When 2D location was different, it differed in 
both horizontal and vertical position (i.e., diagonally opposite corner of occlusion square). 
These four conditions were counterbalanced and equally likely. As in Experiment 1, location 
was always irrelevant to the task, which was to judge same/different color. Timing was the 
same as Experiment 1, except that stimuli were presented for 500ms instead of 250ms. 
 
3.2. Results  
3.2.1. Congruency Bias. Figure 3 illustrates the bias to respond “same color” as a 
function of the irrelevant location conditions. Depth location information cued using occlusion 
and size did not bias color judgments. A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with factors 2D 
location (same/different) and depth location (same/different) revealed a main effect of 2D 
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location (F1,16 = 8.13, p = 0.012, ηp2 = 0.35), but no effect of depth location (F1,16 = 0.46, p = 0.510, 
ηp2 = 0.03), and no significant interaction (F1,16 = 1.61, p = 0.223, ηp2 = 0.10). 
3.2.2. Other effects. For d’ (Table 1), there was a significant influence of 2D location 
(F1,16 = 17.82, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 0.54), but no effect for depth location (F1,16 = 1.06, p = 0.320, ηp2 = 
0.07), with no interaction (F1,16 = 4.24, p = 0.057, ηp2 = 0.22). RT priming was significant for both 
2D and depth location (2D: F1,16 = 9.61, p = 0.007, ηp2 = 0.39, Z: F1,16 = 15.08, p = 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.50), with a significant interaction (F1,16 = 11.37, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.43). 
 
Figure 3. Congruency bias results from Experiment 2. Bias is plotted for each of the four 
irrelevant location conditions, same or different 2D and depth (occlusion and size) location. 
Negative response biases indicate greater likelihood to report “same”. Error bars show SEM 
(N=16). 
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3.3. Discussion 
 In terms of the spatial congruency bias, in Experiment 2 we again replicated the 2D 
location bias found in Golomb et al. (2014) and in Experiment 1, but here we found that depth 
location using monocular cues did not result in a significant spatial congruency bias. It is worth 
noting that both experiments showed significant reaction time priming for same versus 
different depth, as seen in previous research (Atchley et al., 1997; Downing & Pinker, 1985), 
indicating that participants were sensitive to the depth information from both binocular and 
monocular cues. However, only the binocular disparity cued depth information resulted in a 
spatial congruency bias. 
 The finding that depth from binocular disparity biases color judgments but depth from 
occlusion and size does not do so suggests that the spatial congruency bias is not a 
generalizable phenomenon common to all depth cues. This leads to the question: was the 
congruency bias seen in Experiment 1 driven by depth location information at all? In other 
words, does depth-from-disparity bias color judgments, or was the effect due to low-level 
disparity differences in 2D location between the eyes?  
 To test this question, in Experiment 3 we asked if vertical disparity information biases 
color judgments. Vertical disparity stimuli involve displaying items at slightly different vertical 
locations in each eye, with no associated depth percept. If the results from Experiment 1 were 
due to the depth percept, we would not expect vertical disparity to exhibit a spatial congruency 
bias, whereas if it were low-level disparity differences producing this bias, then vertical 
disparity should also bias color judgments.  
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4.0. Experiment 3 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants. Sixteen subjects (9 female; mean age = 20 years; range: 18-24) 
participated. None were excluded. 
4.1.2. Stimuli, Procedure & Design. The stimuli and procedure were the same as 
Experiment 1, except that instead of testing horizontal disparity, Experiment 3 tested vertical 
disparity. Vertical disparity was the same magnitude as horizontal disparity in Experiment 1: 30 
arcmin (0.5°), half in one direction (randomly up or down) for one eye, and the other half in the 
opposite direction for the opposite eye. Thus, on trials where vertical disparity was different, 
the two stimuli covered the same vertical positions, but the eye-specific position reversed 
between stimuli. Likewise, whereas Experiment 1 varied 2D location using vertical differences 
of 5.46° above or below fixation, Experiment 3 varied 2D location using horizontal differences 
of 5.46° left or right of fixation (with vertical location aligned with fixation). The four irrelevant 
location conditions (same/different 2D horizontal location x same/different vertical disparity) 
were counterbalanced and equally likely. 
 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Congruency Bias. Figure 4 illustrates the bias to respond “same color” as a 
function of the irrelevant location conditions. Irrelevant vertical disparity location information 
biased color judgments, such that participants were more likely to report that the two stimuli 
were the same color when they had the same vertical disparity information, compared to 
different vertical disparity (eye-specific location) information. A two-way repeated-measures 
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ANOVA with factors vertical disparity (same/different) and horizontal location (same/different) 
revealed significant main effects of both horizontal location and vertical disparity (X; F1,15 = 
9.12, p = 0.009, ηp2 = 0.38, Y; F1,15 = 16.55, p = 0.001, ηp2 = .053 respectively), with no significant 
interaction (F1,15 = 3.55, p = 0.079, ηp2 = 0.19). 
4.2.2. Other effects. For d’ (Table 1), there was a significant influence of horizontal 
location (F1,15 = 29.30, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.66), but none for vertical disparity (F1,15 = 0.40, p = 
0.539, ηp2 = 0.03), with no interaction (F1,15 = 2.92, p = 0.108, ηp2 = 0.16). For RT priming there 
were no significant main effects (X: F1,15 = 0.03, p = 0.871, ηp2 < 0.01, Y: F1,15 = 1.37, p = 0.260, ηp2 
= 0.08) or interaction (F1,15 = 2.93, p = 0.107, ηp2 = 0.16). 
 
Figure 4. Congruency bias results from Experiment 3. Bias is plotted for each of the four 
irrelevant location conditions, same or different 2D (horizontal) and vertical disparity location. 
Negative response biases indicate greater likelihood to report “same”. Error bars show SEM 
(N=16). 
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4.3. Discussion 
As in the previous experiments, 2D location information resulted in a strong spatial 
congruency bias. Surprisingly, vertical disparity also resulted in a significant spatial congruency 
bias for color judgments. Because vertical disparity entails different eye-specific location 
information without producing any depth percept, this finding suggests that the results from 
Experiment 1 were likely due to the low-level disparity differences for each eye rather than 
depth information. 
 
5.0. General Discussion 
 We investigated the effect of depth location information on color judgments across 
three experiments. Previous work reported a spatial congruency bias, where two objects were 
more likely to be judged as having the same features when they appeared in the same 2D 
location (Golomb et al., 2014). In the current paper we replicated this prior result and tested 
whether depth location also biases feature judgments. While we found initial evidence that 
depth from binocular disparity seemed to bias color judgments in Experiment 1, the results 
from Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that depth location does not in fact bias color judgments, 
indicating that the spatial congruency bias does not extend to 3D location.  
Before further discussion, it is important to note that the congruency bias reflects a 
different type of effect than response facilitation measured by reaction time or sensitivity. 
Both RT and d’ measure facilitation; that is, an increase in performance when an irrelevant 
dimension is repeated. The congruency bias, on the other hand, does not necessarily improve 
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performance, but rather results in a shift in the responses, and has been argued to reflect 
something more fundamental about the role of location in object perception (Golomb et al, 
2014). In this sense the congruency bias could be seen as similar to the Simon or Stroop tasks 
(Lu & Proctor, 1995; Simon, 1990; Stroop, 1935), such that when the location is the same, 
participants might be unable to suppress a response to that property, even though it is task 
irrelevant. However, while the Simon and Stroop tasks are typically understood as response 
interference effects, Golomb et al. (2014) argued that the congruency bias reflects more of a 
perceptual-level shift. While the bias (criterion) measure is traditionally associated with 
changes in response, bias effects can in fact result from either perceptual or response 
processes (Mack, Richler, Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2011; Wixted & Stretch, 2000), and may reflect 
a perceptual-level effect even when there is no effect on d-prime/sensitivity (Morgan, Hole, & 
Glennerster, 1990; Witt, Taylor, Sugovic, & Wixted, 2015). In the original spatial congruency 
bias report, Golomb et al (2014) reported that even when judgments were made using a sliding 
scale that eliminated the response conflict, participants were more likely to rate two objects as 
more similar when location was the same, and that this effect was only present for 
perceptually difficult discriminations (Golomb et al., 2014).  
Thus, the spatial congruency bias may carry different theoretical implications than a 
sensitivity effect, even though both may be perceptual in nature. Moreover, it is possible for 
the two effects to co-exist, such that location information may both bias and improve feature 
judgments. In previous reports of the spatial congruency bias (Golomb et al., 2014; Shafer-
Skelton et al., Submitted), the bias was sometimes accompanied by a sensitivity effect, as we 
found here for 2D information, but in several of the original experiments there was only a bias 
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effect and no change in sensitivity, suggesting that observers give more “same” responses 
even when sensitivity is equalized. Thus, the congruency bias seems to tap into something 
fundamental about the object-location binding process, where object location (at least in 2D) is 
automatically incorporated into perception of object features. 
 Here we investigated the role of depth location information in this process, asking if 
depth is processed like another type of location (in which case we would expect depth to 
induce a spatial congruency bias and bias color judgments), or if depth is more like other 
features (in which case it should not induce a congruency bias). Note that in the original spatial 
congruency bias report (Golomb et al, 2014), features such as color and shape did not induce a 
congruency bias, even when the differences were highly salient, whereas even small, near-
threshold differences in 2D location biased feature judgments. In Experiments 1 and 2, we 
tested large, salient differences in depth location, finding that binocular – but not monocular – 
depth cues biased color judgments.  
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the influence of depth is tenuous at 
best, and is not generalizable across different depth cues. In Experiment 3 we further probed 
the role of depth information, dissociating the effects of depth-from-disparity information 
from pure disparity (eye-specific location) information. As the same vertical disparity and 
different vertical disparity conditions both have the same amount of overlap between the two 
eyes, any effect of color perception or fusion should be the same across these conditions. 
Combined with our results from Experiment 2, the finding that vertical disparity biased color 
judgments even though it does not create a depth percept suggests that depth location does 
not bias object perception. However, we cannot rule out an alternative interpretation that the 
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congruency bias seen in Experiment 1 was due to combined depth and disparity information, 
and that binocular depth but not monocular depth biases the perception of object features. 
Binocular disparity is arguably one of the stronger and more realistic cues for depth perception 
(Finlayson, Remington, & Grove, 2012; McKee & Taylor, 2010), and Finlayson et al. (2012) 
demonstrated that there is variation in the perception of motion in depth depending on the 
cues used to simulate depth. That said, in both Experiments 1 and 2 we found RT priming 
effects for depth, as expected based on previous 3D attention literature (Atchley et al., 1997; 
Downing & Pinker, 1985), indicating that participants perceived and were sensitive to depth 
information in both cases. Therefore we believe it is unlikely that these results are due to a 
difference in depth cue, and more likely due to position-in-depth information not biasing color 
judgments, with the binocular disparity results from Experiment 1 reflecting disparity and not 
depth effects. 
Our results indicate that depth does not induce a spatial congruency bias, similar to the 
lack of bias induced by other features such as shape and color (Golomb et al., 2014). We 
therefore propose that – at least in this context – depth information is treated more similarly to 
other types of object features, rather than as an aspect of object location. Our findings provide 
support for a special role of location in the binding process, but only for 2D location. An 
account of location as a privileged feature proposes that irrelevant location information is 
automatically encoded with other object features, biasing their perceptual judgments. In this 
account, 2D location serves as an index to group or bind features of an object together, an 
important cue for object recognition (Golomb et al., 2014; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 
1992). The fact that this special role does not seem to extend to position-in-depth information 
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is consistent with studies suggesting weakened or delayed effects of depth compared to 2D 
location (Finlayson et al., 2013; Gilinsky, 1951; Kasai et al., 2003; Loomis et al., 2008; Moore et 
al., 2009), and suggests that other research finding similar perceptual and attentional 
responses for 2D and depth effects (Atchley et al., 1997; Downing & Pinker, 1985; Finlayson et 
al., 2013; Nakayama & Silverman, 1986) may instead reflect later processes or feedback effects 
less involved in the binding process. 
Moreover, the idea that 2D – but not 3D – location may serve as a fundamental index or 
cue for object binding carries interesting neural implications for representations of object 
location and identity. One fundamental question is to what extent “what” and “where” 
information is processed separately in the brain. While original accounts suggested a strict 
dichotomy of two separate visual streams (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Mishkin, Ungerleider, & 
Macko, 1983; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982), recent evidence supports a more nuanced story 
(Carlson, Hogendoorn, Fonteijn, & Verstraten, 2011; Cichy, Chen, & Haynes, 2011; DiCarlo & 
Maunsell, 2003; Golomb & Kanwisher, 2012; Kravitz, Kriegeskorte, & Baker, 2010; Op De Beeck 
& Vogels, 2000; Schwarzlose, Swisher, Dang, & Kanwisher, 2008). As proposed in Golomb et 
al. (2014), the spatial congruency bias suggests that object identity may never be represented 
fully independently of location, and our findings are consistent with this proposal, with the 
caveat that we only see this advantage for 2D location, not depth locations. Depth information 
has been reported in both dorsal and ventral stream visual areas, including known object- and 
feature-processing areas such as LOC, MT, and V4 (DeAngelis & Newsome, 1999; Finlayson, 
Zhang, & Golomb, Under Review; Hubel & Wiesel, 1970; P. Neri, 2004; Parker, 2007; Preston et 
al., 2008; Tanabe, Doi, Umeda, & Fujita, 2005; Tsao et al., 2003; Welchman et al., 2005), raising 
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the interesting possibility that 2D location information may be more integrated than depth 
information with the object feature information in these regions. Another possibility is that 
this aspect of the binding process occurs earlier in visual processing, perhaps before depth 
information is fully represented. Binocular disparity information is found in early visual cortex 
(Hubel & Wiesel, 1970; Skalicky, 2016), but perceptually relevant position-in-depth information 
may not emerge until later visual areas (Barendregt et al., 2015; Finlayson et al., Under Review; 
Preston et al., 2008), 
Regardless, it appears that 2D location plays a more fundamental role in the binding 
process than does position-in-depth. However, it is unclear if the spatial congruency bias is only 
seen for 2D location, with all other features treated equally, or if it perhaps reflects a hierarchy 
(e.g. Felleman & van Essen, 1991; van Essen & Zeki, 1978) where features processed earlier in 
the visual processing stream might bias the judgments of more complex features processed 
later. For example, depth might not influence low-level features like color or orientation, but 
perhaps might influence a more complex judgment such as face perception. Other research 
from our group has shown that 2D location biases features regardless of complexity (e.g., 
exerting similar effects on Gabors and faces; Shafer-Skelton et al., Under Review), and that 
neither color nor shape bias one another (Golomb et al., 2014), but the possibility of a 
hierarchy of 3D location processing cannot be ruled out in our current study. 
Finally, a surprising and important result we uncovered was the robust effect of eye-
specific location information on object perception; i.e., that color judgments were biased by 2D 
location information that was only present as a relative difference between the two eyes. For 
example, if Object 1 was centered 0.5˚ above the midline in the left eye and 0.5˚ below the 
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midline in the right eye, participants were more likely to judge Object 2 as being the same 
color if it maintained this exact disparity information, compared to a subtle swap between eyes 
(0.5˚ below the midline in the left eye and 0.5˚ above the midline in the right eye), even though 
the average position across eyes was identical in both cases. This indicates a very low-level and 
early effect of 2D location, before location information from each eye is combined and 
averaged, suggesting that the spatial congruency bias occurs very early in visual processing. 
This would be consistent with research showing that the spatial congruency bias is present in 
low-level retinotopic (eye-centered) coordinates rather than the more ecological spatiotopic 
(world-centered) coordinates across eye movements (Shafer-Skelton et al., Submitted). 
However, this comparison is particularly interesting in light of evidence showing that depth 
information is represented explicitly in visual cortex (Bridge & Parker, 2007; Finlayson et al., 
Under Review; Hubel & Wiesel, 1970), whereas spatiotopic representations are not (Gardner, 
Merriam, Movshon, & Heeger, 2008; Golomb & Kanwisher, 2012). Thus it is interesting that 
neither depth nor spatiotopic position seem to influence the congruency bias, yet tiny 
differences in eye-specific position can cause substantial influences on judgments of features 
such as color. Although some theories of object-location binding have suggested that binding 
occurs later in visual processing (e.g., Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999), perhaps even in medial 
temporal lobe or prefrontal cortex (e.g., Hannula & Ranganath, 2008; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, 
& D’Esposito, 2000; Rao, Rainer, & Miller, 1997), this eye-specific finding suggests that at least 
certain aspects of object-location binding occur much earlier, relying solely on low-level 2D 
location cues.  
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Table 1. Summary of all measures for Experiments 1-3.  
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